

ISS 1715: The Art of War

Quest 1: War and Peace

I. General Information

Class Meetings

- Fall 2025
- Attendance: 100% In-Person
- Period: T 1:55-2:45/R 1:55-3:50
- Location: CSE 461

Instructor

- Dr. Michael Leggiere
- Office: CSE 542
- Office Hours: T: 3:00-5:00/R: 2:00-4:00
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Course Description

For centuries, generals have searched for an “art of war” that could be used to defeat their enemy but what is an “art of war”? The art of war is closely tied to the term “strategy.” Strategy derives from the ancient Greek word *strategos*. Translated literally it means "the general's art." In general, it refers to military matters such as the overall conduct of a war. Likewise for centuries, military practitioners and theorists have written on strategy and the key figures who have shaped the theory and practice of war and statecraft. This multidisciplinary course provides global, comparative perspectives on strategic thought from antiquity to today, surveying both classical and current themes of strategy in search of an “art of war.” It includes historical case-studies so that students can develop their own concepts of strategy and the art of war.

Quest and General Education Credit

- Quest 1
- Humanities
- Writing Requirement (WR) 2000 words

This course accomplishes the [Quest](#) and [General Education](#) objectives of the subject areas listed above. A minimum grade of C is required for Quest and General Education credit. Courses intended to satisfy Quest and General Education requirements cannot be taken S-U.

The Writing Requirement (WR) ensures students both maintain their fluency in writing and use writing as a tool to facilitate learning.

Course grades have two components. To receive writing requirement credit, a student must receive a grade of C or higher and a satisfactory completion of the writing component of the course.

Required Readings and Works

1. This course helps to satisfy the Writing Requirement; students are recommended to obtain a copy of *The New Oxford Style Manual*, (Oxford University Press, 2016). ISBN: 978-0198767251.
2. Materials and Supplies Fees: n/a
3. All other readings will be made available in Canvas or provided in class; bibliographic information is included in the weekly schedule:

Course Objectives

1. Identify, describe, and explain the methodologies used across humanities disciplines to examine essential ideas about the art of war.
2. Identify, describe, and explain key ideas and questions about strategy from antiquity to the present.
3. Analyze how philosophical, political and historical works from antiquity through the present explore the art of war.
4. Analyze and evaluate specific accounts of human reaction to concepts that challenge our own notions of strategy, using close reading, critical analysis, class discussion, and personal reflection.
5. Develop and present clear and effective written and oral work that demonstrates critical engagement with course texts, and experiential learning activities.
6. Communicate well-supported ideas and arguments effectively within class discussion and debates, with clear oral presentation and written work articulating students' personal reflections on the art of war.
7. Connect course content with students' intellectual, personal, and professional lives at UF and beyond.
8. Reflect on students' own and others' thoughts on strategy in class discussion and written work.

Understanding the Art of War is a timeless toolkit for navigating a complex and competitive world. It is not about winning on the battlefield, it's about winning at everything you do. You might be thinking, "I'm a computer science major," or "I'm pre-med," or "I'm studying engineering. What does this have to do with me?" The answer is: everything. Most of us operate on a tactical level, focusing on the immediate task: finish the task, pass the exam, get through the week. This is like a soldier only seeing a few feet in front of them. Strategy is the art of seeing the entire battlefield—or in your case, the entire "board" of your life and career.

Sun Tzu wrote, “The victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won.” Here, he is advising against jumping into a situation (a major, a job application, any life-altering event, etc.) and simply hoping that it will all work out in your favor. Instead, Sun Tzu advises you to prepare, understand the landscape, and create the conditions for your success before the critical moment arrives. A well-chosen major, a network built over years of achievement, and a polished resume are victories won long before the job interview.

Understanding the Art of War teaches you to know the terrain, to understand your environment. In war, strategists obsess over terrain (mountains, hills, rivers, swamps, forests) and weather. In this sense, “terrain” exists in every part of your life. In college, the terrain is the professor’s grading style, course assignments, the structure of the final exam, and your non-curricular social dynamics. Understanding this terrain will allow you to focus your time and energy on where they are needed most and have the most impact. Not understanding the terrain of college is like launching a frontal attack in a blinding snowstorm. In your career, the terrain is the job market, the culture of a company you want to work for, the current economic climate, and the technological trends shaping your industry. Applying for a job without understanding this terrain is like marching an army into a swamp. Studying strategy trains you to analyze your environment, identify opportunities and threats, and position yourself on “high ground.”

Understanding strategy teaches you the ultimate competitive advantage: know yourself, know your enemy.” One of the most famous lines from Sun Zu is: “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.” In your case, the enemy is not a person; it’s an obstacle, a task, an assignment, a difficult concept in class, or even your own procrastination. Know yourself: What are your strengths and weaknesses? How much time and energy can you realistically commit? What are your non-negotiable values? An honest self-assessment prevents you from fighting battles you cannot win. Know your “enemy.” What does the job market actually demand? What skills do other top candidates have? What is the company’s biggest problem that you can solve? Research and intelligence are the keys to outmaneuvering obstacles.

Finally, the art of war teaches you that resources are finite. No army has unlimited soldiers, supplies, or time. Neither do you. Your most valuable resources are your time, energy, and focus. Strategy is about resource allocation. It forces you to ask yourself questions like when is it better to make a strategic retreat (drop a class that’s draining you for no reason) to win a larger war (protect your GPA and mental health)? You study your “terrain,” you identify its needs, and you craft a strategy that maximizes your strengths and unique skills (“knowing yourself”). The world is a competitive place. Learning the principles of strategy gives you a durable, intellectual advantage. It elevates your thinking from simply doing tasks to designing outcomes. It’s not about being ruthless; it’s about being smart, prepared, and deliberate. It’s the art of achieving your objectives with the least amount of conflict and wasted effort. In a world full of distractions, strategic thinking is your lifeline. It’s a superpower, and it’s one you can start developing right now. Studying strategy isn’t about learning how to fight. It’s about learning how to think. It’s about developing a mental framework to achieve your goals efficiently and effectively, especially when faced with challenges, competition, or limited resources—which perfectly describes college, your future career, relationships, and life in general.

II. Graded Work

Description of Graded Work

1. Active Participation and Attendance: 20%

a. Participation: 10%

- i. An exemplary participant shows evidence of having done the assigned reading before each class, consistently offers thoughtful points and questions for discussion, and listens considerably to other discussants. See participation rubric below. (R)

b. Class Attendance: 10%

- i. On-time class attendance is required for this component of the course grade. You may have two unexcused absences without any penalty, but starting with the third class missed your grade will be affected. Starting with the third unexcused absence, each unexcused absence reduces your attendance grade by 2/3: an A- becomes a B, and so on.
- ii. Except for absence because of religious holiday observance, documentation is required for excused absences, per university policy. Excessive unexcused absences (10 or more) will result in failure of the course. If you miss 10 or more classes (excused or not), you will miss material essential for successful completion of the course.

2. Experiential Learning Component: 10%

During the semester, the Hamilton School at UF will host numerous guest speakers as part of its “War, Strategy, and Statecraft” undergraduate and graduate program. Attendance at TWO of these events is mandatory for the full 10% of the Experiential Learning grade. You must attend TWO to earn the full 10%.

3. In-class Reading Quizzes: 20%

- a. Reading quizzes will be administered at the start of class on Monday, four times throughout the semester. They will test the student’s knowledge of the week’s readings, and will contain short-answer, true/false, and multiple-choice questions. Professor will provide written feedback on your short-answer questions. See grading rubric below. (R)
- b. Quiz dates: 9 September, 30 September, 21 October, and 2 December
- c.

4. Midterm Examination: 25%

- a. On 23 October, a midterm examination will be administered in class. The examination will be online. It will include essay, short-answer, true-false, and/or multiple-choice questions. The professor will provide written feedback on your essay and/or short-answer questions. See grading rubric below. (R)

5. Final Analytical Paper: 25%

- a. You will submit a 2,000 word (minimum) analytical essay by 5:00 pm on 11 December. It will address a prompt provided to you by Unit 5. You will develop an analytic argument based on your own thesis responding to the prompt, incorporating course material on the history and philosophy of that relationship. Your paper must incorporate at least four course readings. See Canvas for more details. The professor will provide written feedback. See grading rubric below. (R)
- b. The professor will evaluate and provide written feedback, on all the student's written assignments with respect to grammar, punctuation, clarity, coherence, and organization.
- c. You may want to access the university's [Writing Studio](#).
- d. An additional writing guide website can be found at [OWL](#).
- e. See Writing Assessment Rubric on syllabus.

III. Annotated Weekly Schedule

UNIT 1 (21 – 26 AUGUST): WHAT IS STRATEGY?

Napoleon once stated that “strategy is the art of plans of campaign, and tactics are the art of battles.” Despite coming from such an authority on the waging of war, this definition failed to provide a consensus on how strategy was best understood. Some 200 years after Napoleon, strategy and the art of war still lack concrete definitions. This week we will analyze some of the theories concerning the meanings of “strategy” and the “art of war.”

Readings: 65 pages

1. Peter Paret, “Introduction,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 3-10.
2. Lawrence Freedman, “Strategy: The History of an Idea,” in *The New Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Hal Brands (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2023), pp. 15-40.
3. Beatrice Heuser, “What Is Strategy?” in *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 3-36.

Calendar:

1. 21 August: Course Intro: What is strategy
2. 26 August: Guest Lecture
3. 26 August: Experiential Learning Opportunity 5:00 pm - 7:00 pm, room: TBD

UNIT 2 (28 AUGUST – 2 SEPTEMBER): THE ANCIENT WORLD

The Athenian historian and general, Thucydides (460–400 BC), offers the earliest intelligent, “professional” critique of war and politics in Western literature. Although the characters and city states described are largely forgotten today, the book reveals universal questions and problems about the art of war that vex statesmen and military leaders alike. This week we will analyze this quote from Thucydides written in 400 BC: “I shall be satisfied if my words are judged useful by those who desire a clear understanding of the events which occurred in the past and which will occur again, in much the same way, in the future, human nature being what it is.”

Readings: 55 pages

1. Karl Walling, “Thucydides on Policy, Strategy, and War Termination,” *Naval War College Review* 66 (2013), No. 4, Article 6. <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss4/6>. 40 pages.
2. Julia Kindt, “Guide to the Classics: Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War,” in *The Conversation*. <https://theconversation.com/guide-to-the-classics-thucydides-history-of-the-peloponnesian-war-71550>. 10 pages

3. S.N. Jaffe, "The Risks and Rewards of Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War" in *War on the Rocks*. <https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/the-risks-and-rewards-of-thucydides-history-of-the-peloponnesian-war/>. 5 pages

Calendar:

1. 28 August: Discussion: Strategy in the Ancient World
2. 2 September: Same
3. 3 September: Experiential Learning Opportunity 5:00 pm - 7:00 pm, room: TBD

UNIT 3 (4 – 9 SEPTEMBER): SUN ZI

Sun Zi (544–496 BC) was a Chinese general, military strategist, philosopher, and writer who revolutionized war and combat. He is most famously known for his book, *The Art of War*, a guide on how to successfully engage in conflict and battle. His oft quoted principle that “the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting” is widely viewed as modern China’s current mantra. Sun Zi approached war from a psychological perspective, claiming that the best victories were possible without fighting. This week we analyze Sun Zi’s ideas on the objective of war, the essential characteristics of war and strategy, the role of policy, the uses of intelligence, the best way to treat an adversary, the requirements of command, and the difference between the direct and indirect approaches.

Readings: 65 pages

1. Mark McNeilly, *Sun Zi and the Art of Modern Warfare* (New York, 2015; online edition, Oxford Academic, 10 Feb. 2015), Intro and Chapters 1 & 2, pp. 3-68, accessed 21 Aug. 2024. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199957859.001.0001>

Calendar:

1. 4 September: Discussion: Sun Zi
2. 9 September: Same
3. **9 September: Reading Quiz #1.**

UNIT 4 (11 – 16 SEPTEMBER): MACHIAVELLI

Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) has been called the father of modern political philosophy. If Americans remember him at all, though, it is more likely as the Father of Lies: the political schemer with an eponymous adjective thanks to *The Prince*, his manual of amoral advice to rulers. Machiavelli’s experiences taught him that war, and military matters in general, had always been used politically. This week, we will analyze how he viewed war as an extension of political values and goals.

Readings: 49 pages

1. Felix Gilbert, "Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War," in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 11-31.
2. Matthew Kroenig, "Machiavelli and the Naissance of Modern Strategy," in *The New Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Hal Brands (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 91-115.
3. John Sloan, Machiavelli's Art of War: A Summary, Zenohon Group <http://www.xenophon-mil.org/milhist/renaissance/machwar.htm>

Calendar:

1. 11 September: Discussion: Machiavelli
2. 16 September: Same

UNIT 5 (18 – 23 SEPTEMBER): NAPOLEON

Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) harnessed the resources unleashed by the French Revolution (1789-1799) to perfect modern warfare. With mass-conscripted armies numbering in the 100,000s, he implemented a strategy of annihilation that rendered the enemy either incapable or unwilling (usually both) to continue the war. His strategy was simple: find and destroy the enemy's main army, all other concerns were secondary. This week we will analyze the rise and fall of the greatest strategist in military history.

Readings: 64 pages

1. Peter Paret, "Napoleon and the Revolution in War," in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 123-142.
2. Michael Leggiere, "Napoleon and the Strategy of the Single Point," in *The New Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Hal Brands (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 319-344.
3. David Chandler, "French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Warfare," in *The Art of Warfare on Land* (New York: Hamlyn, 1974), pp. 149-167.

Calendar:

1. 18 September: Discussion: Napoleon
2. 23 September: Same

UNIT 6 (25-30 SEPTEMBER): CLAUSEWITZ

The Prussian officer and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) served in the wars against Napoleon. The lessons he took away from those experiences stressed the primacy of policy in the art of war. "War is a continuation of policy by other means" – "Policy will permeate all military operations." Here we have the essence of civil-military relations. This week we will address several questions: How does Clausewitz compare with Sun Zi? Is there a constant and proper relationship between the uniformed military and civilian decision-makers? Clausewitz speaks of limited and unlimited war-how are they different? Why are most wars waged with less than total effort?

Readings: 59 pages

1. Peter Paret, "Clausewitz," in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 186-216.
2. Hew Strachan, "The Elusive Meaning and Enduring Relevance of Clausewitz," in *The New Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Hal Brands (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 116-145.

Calendar:

1. 25 September: Discussion: Clausewitz
2. 30 September: Same
3. **30 September: Reading Quiz #2.**

UNIT 7 (2-7 OCTOBER): JOMINI

The Swiss-born general staff officer, Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869), served in Napoleon's army until 1813. After being passed over for promotion, he defected and joined the Russian army, where he served for 50 years! This meant that as a military theorist and commentator of the Napoleonic Wars, he had the last word, because he outlived everyone. In his book, the *Art of War*, Jomini seeks to find scientific principles from Napoleon's campaigns and categorize them into key principles of war and strategy that anyone could use. His claim was that anyone who followed his principles of war would be successful because he derived them from the great Napoleon. This week we will analyze how Jomini viewed strategy as the art of moving forces on the map to bring them to bear in the appropriate theater of operations at the decisive place and point in time.

Readings: 66 pages

1. John Shy, "Jomini," in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 143-185.
2. Antulio Echevarria, "Jomini, Modern War, and Strategy: The Triumph of the Essential," in *The New Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Hal Brands (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 145-169.

Calendar:

1. 2 October: Discussion: Jomini
2. 7 October: Same

UNIT 8 (9-14 OCTOBER): THE PRUSSIAN TRADITION

Throughout the 1800s, new technology revolutionized the conduct of war. The nineteenth century saw the introduction of steam-driven rapid movement on land (railroads) and at sea (steamships). Steam-powered factories made possible for the first time the mass manufacture of standardized weapons, munitions, supplies, and other needs of armies and navies. The Prussians combined their new weapons with a new approach of strategic offensive to destroy the enemy army in a *Kesselschlacht* (cauldron battle) by surrounding the enemy army on at least three sides. This week we analyze the evolution of Prussian strategic thinking up to the First World War.

Readings: 62 pages

1. Hajo Holborn, "The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff," in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 281-295.
2. Gunther E. Rothenberg, "Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment," in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 296-325.
3. Margaret MacMillan, "Strategy, War Plans, and the First World War," in *The New Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Hal Brands (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 471-494.

Calendar:

1. 9 October: Discussion: The Prussian Tradition
2. 14 October: Same
3. 15 October: Experiential Learning Opportunity 5:00 pm - 7:00 pm, room: TBD

UNIT 9 (16-21 OCTOBER): THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Influenced by the writings of Clausewitz and not appreciating the great technological changes that made the battlefield infinitely more lethal, the Central Powers and Entente Powers went to war in August 1914 believing their soldiers would be home by Christmas. After Germany's Schlieffen Plan failed to achieve a *Kesselschlacht* to knock France out of the war, both sides settled on a strategy of attrition that led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands. This week we will analyze what went wrong with the German strategy of annihilation and understand why the Western Front suffered through bloody stalemate until a new strategy emerged in 1918.

Readings: 79 pages

1. Michael Howard, "Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914," in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 281-295.
2. Williamson Murry, "The Strategy of Decisive War versus the Strategy of Attrition," in *The New Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Hal Brands (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 495-521.
3. Williamson Murry, "Strategy and Total War," in *The New Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Hal Brands (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 522-544.
4. Michael Geyer, "German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare," in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 527-555.

Calendar:

1. 16 October: Discussion: The First World War
2. 21 October: Same
3. **21 October: Reading Quiz #3**
4. **23 October: Midterm Examination**

UNIT 10 (28-30 OCTOBER): THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR

Is there an American “way of war”? If so, what is it and how did it develop? With the passage of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, the US settled into a form of “Splendid Isolation” that was supported by the British government and its Royal Navy. In this way, the Western Hemisphere was largely shielded from European interference. Two decades later, the US defeated Mexico for control of Texas but it was not until the 1890s that the Americans defeated a European power: Spain. Despite the victory, a strong tradition of isolation remained imbedded in Americans. This week, we will look at President Woodrow Wilson’s 1917 decision to lead the US into the First World War. We will also seek to find an American “way of war” on the bloody battlefields of France.

Readings: 58 pages

1. Russell F. Weigley, “American Strategy from Its Beginnings through the First World War,” *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 408-443.
2. Robert Kagan, “Woodrow Wilson and the Rise of Modern American Grand Strategy,” in *The New Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Hal Brands (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 545-568.

Calendar:

1. 28 October: Discussion: The American way of War
2. 30 October: Same

UNIT 11 (4-6 NOVEMBER): NATIONAL STRATEGIES

Disillusioned with the state system that emerged following the First World War, the Germans embraced an attitude of revenge and empowered a maniacal dictatorship that unleashed the Second World War. On the other side of the world, Japan sought to upend the US presence and influence in Asia to conquer the western Pacific. In the ensuing struggle, states such as China, France, and the Soviet Union fought for their very survival. This week our objective is to gain an understanding of Japanese, American, Soviet, and German strategies during the Second World War.

Readings: 53 pages

1. Condoleezza Rice, “The Making of Soviet Strategy,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 648-676.
2. D. Clayton James, “American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 703-734.

Calendar:

1. 4 November: Discussion: National Strategies

2. 5 November: Experiential Learning Opportunity 5:00 pm - 7:00 pm, room: TBD
3. 6 November: Discussion: National Strategies

UNIT 12 (13-18 NOVEMBER): AXIS AND ALLIES

Both Hitler and Stalin sought to disrupt the geopolitical order that had emerged in Europe during the 1920s and 1930s to such an extent that the two statesmen signed a non-aggression pact in August 1939. On the other side, coalition warfare is notoriously difficult for allies to coordinate strategy. This week we will analyze how the US and Britain managed to avoid the pitfalls of coalition warfare while on the other hand Hitler engaged Stalin in a life-or-death struggle to fulfill his vision of a new, German-dominated geopolitical system.

Readings: 79 pages

1. Tami Davis Biddle, "Democratic Leaders and Strategies of Coalition Warfare: Churchill and Roosevelt in WW II," in *The New Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Hal Brands (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 569-592.
2. Brendan Simms, "Strategies of Geopolitical Revolution: Hitler and Stalin," in *The New Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Hal Brands (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 616-637.
3. Maurice Matloff, "Allied Strategy in Europe," in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 677-702.

Calendar:

1. 13 November: Discussion: Axis & Allies
2. 18 November: Same
3. 19 November: Experiential Learning Opportunity 5:00 pm - 7:00 pm, room: TBD

UNIT 13 (20 NOVEMBER - 2 DECEMBER): THE NUCLEAR AGE

Albert Einstein wrote: "I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones." This quote represents the very real fear of mutual-assured destruction after the proliferation of the technology of splitting the atom for the purposes of war. Yet, war did not end. Instead, strategy had to accommodate this new weapon despite its potential to destroy humankind. This week we will discuss "atomic armies" and the nuclear deterrence.

Readings: 64 pages

1. Lawrence Freedman, "The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists," in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 735-778.
2. Francis J. Gavin, "The Elusive Nature of Nuclear Strategy," in *The New Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Hal Brands (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 692-716.

Calendar:

1. 20 November: Strategy in the nuclear age
2. 2 December: same
3. **2 December: Reading Quiz #4**

Analytical Paper

Due through Canvas by 5:00 pm on 12/11/2025

IV. Grading Scale and Rubrics

Grading Scale

For information on UF's grading policies for assigning grade points, see [here](#).

A	94 - 100%		C	74 - 76%
A-	90 - 93%		C-	70 - 73%
B+	87 - 89%		D+	67 - 69%
B	84 - 86%		D	64 - 66%
B-	80 - 83%		D-	60 - 63%
C+	77 - 79%		E	<60

Grading Rubrics

Participation Rubric

A	Typically comes to class with questions about the readings in mind. Engages others about ideas, respects the opinions of others and consistently elevates the level of discussion
B	Does not always come to class with questions about the reading in mind. Waits passively for others to raise interesting issues. Some in this category, while courteous and articulate, do not adequately listen to other participants or relate their comments to the direction of the conversation.
C	Attends regularly but typically is an infrequent or unwilling participant in discussion.
D-E	Fails to attend class regularly and is inadequately prepared for discussion.

Writing Rubric

	A	B	C	D-E
Thesis and Argumentation	Thesis is clear, specific, and presents a thoughtful, critical, engaging, and creative interpretation. Argument fully supports the thesis both logically and thoroughly.	Thesis is clear and specific, but not as critical or original. Shows insight and attention to the text under consideration. May have gaps in argument's logic.	Thesis is present but not clear or specific, demonstrating a lack of critical engagement to the text. Argument is weak, missing important details or making logical leaps with little support.	Thesis is vague and/or confused, demonstrates a failure to understand the text. Argument lacks any logical flow and does not utilize any source material.
Use of Sources	Primary (and secondary texts, if required) are well incorporated, utilized, and contextualized throughout.	Primary (and secondary texts, if required) are incorporated but not contextualized significantly.	Primary (and secondary texts, if required) are mostly incorporated but are not properly contextualized.	Primary and/or secondary texts are absent.
Organization	Clear organization. Introduction provides adequate background information and ends with a thesis. Details are in logical order. Conclusion is strong and states the point of the paper.	Clear organization. Introduction clearly states thesis, but does not provide as much background information. Details are in logical order, but may be more difficult to follow. Conclusion is recognizable and ties up almost all loose ends.	Significant lapses in organization. Introduction states thesis but does not adequately provide background information. Some details not in logical or expected order that results in a distracting read. Conclusion is recognizable but does not tie up all loose ends.	Poor, hard-to-follow organization. There is no clear introduction of the main topic or thesis. There is no clear conclusion, and the paper just ends. Little or no employment of logical body paragraphs.
Grammar, mechanics, and MLA Style	No errors.	A few errors.	Some errors.	Many errors.

Examination Rubric: Essays and Short Answers

	A	B	C	D-E
Completeness	Shows a thorough understanding of the question. Addresses all aspects of the question completely.	Presents a general understanding of the question. Completely addresses most aspects of the question or address all aspects incompletely.	Shows a limited understanding of the question. Does not address most aspects of the question.	Does not answer the specific central question.
Analysis	Analyses, evaluates, compares and/or contrasts issues and events with depth.	Analyses or evaluates issues and events, but not in any depth.	Lacks analysis or evaluation of the issues and events beyond stating accurate, relevant facts.	Lacks analysis or evaluation of the issues and events beyond stating vague, irrelevant, and/or inaccurate facts.
Evidence	Incorporates pertinent and detailed information from both class discussions and assigned readings.	Includes relevant facts, examples and details but does not support all aspects of the task evenly.	Includes relevant facts, examples and details, but omits concrete examples, includes inaccurate information and/or does not support all aspects of the task.	Does not incorporate information from pertinent class discussion and/or assigned readings.
Writing	Presents all information clearly and concisely, in an organized manner.	Presents information fairly and evenly and may have minor organization problems.	Lacks focus, somewhat interfering with comprehension.	Organizational problems prevent comprehension.

V. Student Learning Outcomes (SLOs)

At the end of this course, students will be expected to have achieved the [Quest](#) and [General Education](#) learning outcomes as follows:

Content: *Students demonstrate competence in the terminology, concepts, theories and methodologies used within the discipline(s).*

- Identify, describe, and explain the methodologies used across humanities disciplines to examine essential ideas about just war (Quest 1, H). **Assessment:** midterm exam, analytical essay, in-class reading quizzes.
- Identify, describe, and explain key ideas and questions about just war from antiquity to the present (Quest 1, H). **Assessment:** midterm exam, analytical essay, in-class reading quizzes.

Critical Thinking: *Students carefully and logically analyse information from multiple perspectives and develop reasoned solutions to problems within the discipline(s).*

- Analyse how philosophical, political and historical works from antiquity through the present explore just war (Quest 1, H). **Assessment:** analytical essay, midterm exam.
- Analyse and evaluate specific accounts of human reaction to concepts that challenge our own notions of just war, using close reading, critical analysis, class discussion, and personal reflection. (Quest 1, H). **Assignments:** analytical essay, discussion questions, midterm exam.

Communication: *Students communicate knowledge, ideas and reasoning clearly and effectively in written and oral forms appropriate to the discipline(s).*

- Develop and present clear and effective written and oral work that demonstrates critical engagement with course texts, and experiential learning activities (Quest 1, H). **Assessments:** experiential learning interview report and discussion, analytical essay, midterm exam.
- Communicate well-supported ideas and arguments effectively within class discussion and debates, with clear oral presentation and written work articulating students' personal experiences and reflections on just war (Quest 1, H). **Assessments:** active class participation, experiential learning component, discussion questions.

Connection: *Students connect course content with meaningful critical reflection on their intellectual, personal, and professional development at UF and beyond.*

- Connect course content with students' intellectual, personal, and professional lives at UF and beyond. (Quest 1). **Assessments:** experiential learning component, analytical paper, discussion questions.
- Reflect on students' own and others' experience with just war, in class discussion and written work (Quest 1). **Assessments:** experiential learning component, analytical paper, discussion questions.

V. Quest Learning Experiences

1. Details of Experiential Learning Component

During the semester, the Hamilton School at UF will host numerous guest speakers as part of its “War, Strategy, and Statecraft” undergraduate and graduate program. Attendance at TWO of these events is mandatory for the full 10% of the Experiential Learning grade. You must attend TWO to earn the full 10%.

2. Details of Self-Reflection Component

Self-reflection is built into many of the assignments, primarily through the reading questions that students create, the analytic essay assignment, and just war experiential learning assignment. In these opportunities for self-reflection offered by specific activities throughout the course, students will reflect on the broader implications of the themes of the course, considering the impact to themselves and/or to a wider community.

VI. Required Policies

Academic Policies

See <https://go.ufl.edu/syllabuspolicies> for the most up-to-date online compendium of academic policies relating to this course.