

ISS2683: What is Statecraft

Quest 1: War and Peace

I. General Information

Class Meetings

- Fall 2025
- Attendance: 100% In-Person, No GTAs, 35 Residential
- R Period 3 (9:35am-10:25am)
- T Period 2-3 (8:30am-10:25am)
- Location CSE 0457

Instructor

- Andrew A. Michta
- Office CSE 0430
- Telephone: TBD
- Email: andrew.michta@ufl.edu
- Office Hours Tuesday 11am-1pm

Course Description

Today's international system is increasingly fractured, with new power centers emerging and new players bidding for regional hegemony. Three decades after the Cold War, the digital revolution, the globalization of manufacturing and the waning of America's "unipolar moment" have forced leaders to reach back to the foundational principles of geopolitics, hard power, and statecraft. The post-Cold War Kantian dream of perpetual peace has yielded to the realities of this Darwinian eco-system we call "international relations," where power balancing, threats, and national interest are paramount. This course will treat the state as a unitary actor of analysis. It will examine the sinews of state power and interplay of geography and economics, as they impact traditional and emerging military domains. It will assess how states define their vital, secondary, and peripheral interests. How do states understand power, and why do they seek alliances? How do governments conceptualize their objectives, and what tools do they deploy to achieve them? The key to understanding these issues is the concept of strategy, i.e., aligning policies with

objectives and the resources at hand, and that of statecraft, which is the art and practice of managing the nation's affairs.

Quest and General Education Credit

- Quest 1
- Humanities
- Writing Requirement (WR) 2000 words

This course accomplishes the [Quest](#) and [General Education](#) objectives of the subject areas listed above. A minimum grade of C is required for Quest and General Education credit. Courses intended to satisfy Quest and General Education requirements cannot be taken S-U.

The Writing Requirement (WR) ensures students both maintain fluency in writing and use writing as a tool to facilitate learning.

Course grades have two components. To receive writing requirement credit, a student must receive a grade of C or higher and a satisfactory completion of the writing component of the course.

Required Readings and Works

1. Halford Mackinder, *Heartland: Three Essays on Geopolitics* (background reading for the entire semester).
2. Matthew Kroenig, *The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy versus Autocracy from the Ancient World to the U.S. and China* (background reading for the entire semester).
3. Other required readings for the course are available as PDFs on Canvas.
4. The writing manual for this course is: *The Economist Style Guide*, 11th edn. (2015). ISBN: 9781610395755. This is available as a PDF on Canvas.
5. Materials and Supplies Fees: n/a. Required readings for the course are available as PDFs on Canvas.
6. The writing manual for this course is: *The Economist Style Guide*, 11th edn. (2015). ISBN: 9781610395755. This is available as a PDF on Canvas.
7. Materials and Supplies Fees: n/a.

II. Graded Work

Description of Graded Work

1. Active Participation and Attendance: 20%

a. Participation: 10%

- i. An exemplary participant shows evidence of having done the assigned reading before each class, consistently offers thoughtful points and questions for discussion, and listens considerably to other discussants. See participation rubric below. (R)

b. Class Attendance: 10%

- i. On-time class attendance is required for this component of the course grade. You may have two unexcused absences without any penalty, but starting with the third class missed your grade will be affected. Starting with the third unexcused absence, each unexcused absence reduces your attendance grade by 2/3: an A- becomes a B, and so on.
- ii. Except for absence because of religious holiday observance, documentation is required for excused absences, per university policy. Excessive unexcused absences (10 or more) will result in failure of the course. If you miss 10 or more classes (excused or not), you will miss material essential for successful completion of the course.

2. Experiential Learning Component: 20%

- i. During this semester, the class will attend the guest lecture by Dakota Wood on August 26, venue to be announced. If you can't attend this particular lecture, please make sure you attend one of the subsequent events scheduled by the WSS Committee. We will discuss it in class.

3. Midterm Examination: 35%

- a. In Week 7, a midterm examination will be administered in class. The examination will be an in-class, 50-minute exam including essay, short-answer, true-false, and/or multiple-choice questions. Professor will provide written feedback on your essay and/or short-answer questions. See grading rubric below. (R)

4. Final Analytical Paper: 25%

- a. During Week 13, you will submit a 2,000 word (minimum) analytical essay addressing a prompt provided to you by Week 5. You will develop an analytic argument based on your own thesis responding to the prompt, incorporating course

material on the history and philosophy of that relationship. Your paper must incorporate at least four course readings. See Canvas for more details. Professor will provide written feedback. See grading rubric below. (R)

- b. Professor will evaluate and provide written feedback, on all the student's written assignments with respect to grammar, punctuation, clarity, coherence, and organization.
- c. You may want to access the university's [Writing Studio](#).
- d. An additional writing guide website can be found at [OWL](#).
- e. See Writing Assessment Rubric on syllabus.

III. Annotated Weekly Schedule

WEEK 1: INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS STATECRAFT? (AUGUST 21)

The question of what statecraft is can be tied to the study of grand strategy. Despite the ever-increasing popularity of the term “grand strategy,” scholars can only agree that grand strategy refers to something that has the characteristics of being long-term in scope, related to the state's highest priorities, and concerned with all spheres of statecraft (military, diplomatic, and economic). Where or what is the precise entity or phenomenon that manifests these characteristics? Is there a single concept of grand strategy that guides statecraft?

Readings: 63 pages

1. Nina Silove, “[Beyond the Buzzword: The Three Meanings of ‘Grand Strategy,’](#)” *Security Studies* 27, no. 1 (2018): 27–57.
2. George, Kateb, “[Thucydides’ History: A Manual of Statecraft,](#)” *Political Science Quarterly* 79, no. 4 (1964), pages 481–503.
3. Andrew Roberts’ Secrets of Statecraft, “[A Masterclass in History from Dr. Henry Kissinger,](#)” 31 March 2022, Hoover Institution, 5 pages.
4. Gladden Pappin, “New Model Statecraft,” 1 April 2022, [The Lamp](#), 5 pages.

WEEK 2: MACHIAVELLI (AUGUST 26 AND AUGUST 28)

Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) has been called the father of modern political philosophy. If Americans remember him at all, though, it is more likely as the Father of Lies: the political schemer with an eponymous adjective thanks to *The Prince*, his manual of amoral advice to rulers. Machiavelli’s experiences taught him that war, and military matters in general, had always been used politically. This week, we will analyze how his statecraft viewed war as an extension of political values and goals.

Readings: 51 pages

1. Greg Russell, “[Machiavelli’s Science of Statecraft: The Diplomacy and Politics of Disorder,](#)” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 16, no. 2 (2005), pages 227–50.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09592290590948306>

2. Matthew Kroenig, "Machiavelli and the Naissance of Modern Strategy," in *The New Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Hal Brands (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 91-115.
3. Annie Pruthi, "[Machiavelli's Prince and His Idea of Statecraft](https://www.drishtiias.com/blog/machiavellis-prince-and-his-idea-of-statecraft)," 30 November 2021, Drishti IAS Blog, 5 pages.
<https://www.drishtiias.com/blog/machiavellis-prince-and-his-idea-of-statecraft>.

WEEK 3: KLEMENS VON METTERNICH (SEPTEMBER 2 AND SEPTEMBER 4)

This week we will analyze the statecraft of Klemens von Metternich (1773-1859) of Austria, the chief architect of the alliance that brought down Napoleon and of the Vienna Treaty of 1815. In the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, he designed a collective security system designed to regulate European politics. This represented a novel experiment in the European union which remains a pressing concern in the contemporary international system.

Readings: 50 pages

1. Kyle Lascurettes, "[The Concert of Europe and Great-Power Governance Today: What Can the Order of 19th-Century Europe Teach Policymakers About International Order in the 21st Century?](#)" (RAND Corporation, 2017), 36 pages.
2. Franz-Stephan Gady, "[From 'Alliance Balance' to 'Coalition Equilibrium': Austria's Transformation of the last Coalition against Napoleon](#)," April 2010, *The Napoleon Series*, 10 pages.
3. Martin Hutchinson, "[The Congress of Vienna at 200: The Enduring Legacy of the Best Peace Conference of all Time](#)," 12 October 2014, *The Globalist*, 4 pages.

WEEK 4: OTTO VON BISMARCK (SEPTEMBER 9 AND SEPTEMBER 11)

This week we will examine the statecraft of Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898), called "the greatest master of diplomacy in the modern era." No historical figure bears more responsibility for the state of great power politics in the long period between 1815 and 1945, and few, if any, in history have managed the strategic policy of their states with such virtuosity. His decisions and policies established the groundwork for the most important geopolitical events of the twentieth century, and his principal creation, a German nation-state at the heart of Europe, endures in truncated form after a half-century of painful adaptation to the world without his guidance.

Readings: 77 pages

1. Marcus Jones, "[Strategy as Character: Bismarck and the Prusso-German Question, 1862–1878](#)," in *The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy, and War*, eds. Williamson Murray, Richard Hart Sinnreich, and James Lacey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 79-110.
2. Hajo Holborn, "[Bismarck's Realpolitik](#)," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 21, no. 1 (1960), pp. 84–98.
3. Stacie E. Goddard, "[When Right Makes Might: How Prussia Overturned the European Balance of Power](#)," *International Security* 33, no. 3 (2008), pp. 110–142.

WEEK 5: METTERNICH AND BISMARCK: A COMPARISON (SEPTEMBER 16 AND SEPTEMBER 18)

This week we will compare the diplomatic strategies employed by Metternich and Bismarck. Both shared a preoccupation with maintaining a stable political and territorial status quo, grounded in mutual restraint and war prevention. In pursuing these aims, both statesmen had to contend with bidirectional danger—from a France susceptible to recurrent paroxysms of revolution and an intermittently expansionist Russian Empire—while simultaneously heading off the menace of revolution. Both ultimately came to see themselves as not only constructing order in a narrow sense but in erecting barricades against chaos and precipitous change. From a strategic perspective, the distinctive feature of Metternich's and Bismarck's statecraft at their apogees was their emphasis on systems (alliances and Concert diplomacy) to prevent conflict rather than merely sequencing rivalries in order to gain advantage in one individual contest before proceeding to the next.

Readings: 116 pages

1. A. Wess Mitchell, "[Mastering the Multi-Front Challenge: The Diplomatic Strategies of Metternich and Bismarck](#)," Marathon Working Paper, 14 December 2021, Prepared for the Office of Net Assessment, United States Department of Defense, 116 pages.

WEEK 6: WOODROW WILSON (SEPTEMBER 23 AND SEPTEMBER 25)

In their studies of President Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921) and the First World War (1914-1918), most historians have assumed that the near-pacifist Wilson had little appreciation for the concept of force as an extension of diplomacy. However, on more careful investigation, it becomes apparent that Wilson not only developed realistic and clearly articulated war goals but that he was

able to coordinate his larger diplomatic purpose with the use of force perhaps better than any war President before or since. Wilson defined the war in reference to democracy, followed by the defeat of the Central Powers, would prove pivotal in the normative and political rehabilitation of the concept. This week we will discuss Wilson's belief that the one of the most important outcomes of the First World War had to be the completion of a process that had started with the American Revolution, as popular sovereignty supplanted monarchy as the dominant form of state legitimacy.

Readings: 56 pages

1. David F. Trask, "[Woodrow Wilson and International Statecraft: A Modern Assessment](#)," *Naval War College Review* 36, no. 2 (1983): pp. 57-68.
2. David F. Trask, "[Woodrow Wilson and the Reconciliation of Force and Diplomacy: 1917-1918](#)," *Naval War College Review* 27, no. 4 (1975): pp. 23-31.
3. David C. Gompert, Hans Binnendijk, and Bonny Lin, "[Woodrow Wilson's Decision to Enter World War I, 1917](#)," in *Blinders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn* (RAND Corporation, 2014), 71-80.
4. Doug Bandow, "[Everything Wrong with the Wilson Administration](#)," 20 February 2024, [Libertarianism.org](#). (16 pages)

WEEK 7: THE FAILURE OF APPEASEMENT (SEPTEMBER 30 AND OCTOBER 2)

Appeasement is often seen as a natural strategy to prevent the horrors of war. This week students will consider why appeasement failed as a strategy in Britain during the 1930s. Did Neville Chamberlain's government try to appease Hitler's Germany not merely out of fear of conflict or misjudgment of Hitler's intentions, but also as a strategic response to domestic political constraints and international pressures? How best should the lessons of Britain's failed appeasement strategy be applied in the present? This week students will develop answers to these difficult questions.

Readings: 55 pages

1. Peter Trubowitz and Peter Harris, "[When States Appear: British Appeasement in the 1930s](#)," *Review of International Studies*, 41, no. 2 (2015), pp. 289-311.
2. Christopher Layne, "[Security Studies and the Use of History: Neville Chamberlain's Grand Strategy Revisited](#)," *Security Studies* 17, No. 3 (2008), pp. 397-437.

Assignment: Midterm Examination

WEEK 8: WINSTON CHURCHILL (OCTOBER 7 AND OCTOBER 9)

Soldier, parliamentarian, Prime Minister, orator, painter, writer, husband, and leader—all of these facets combine to make Churchill one of the most complex and fascinating personalities in history. Churchill was the only British politician of the twentieth century to become an enduring national hero. His unique image, complete with V-sign, giant cigar, and outlandish costumes. Churchill offended every party and faction in the land. Yet all but the most hostile also conceded that he possessed great abilities, remarkable eloquence, and a streak of genius, and with the coming of World War II, the man long excluded from high office—on the grounds that he was a danger to King and Country—became the savior of that country, a truly great war leader. This week we will look at the two great victories Churchill won in World War II. The first was a victory over Nazi Germany. The second, a victory over the legion of skeptics who derided his judgement and denied his claims to greatness.

Readings: 60 pages

1. Robert G. Kaufman, "[Winston S. Churchill and the Art of Statecraft: The Legacy of Principled Internationalism](#)," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 3, no. 2 (1992), pp. 159–87.
2. Matthew Gerth, "[Götterdämmerung Averted: Winston Churchill, Flensburg and the Unthinkable](#)," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 35, no. 1 (2024), pp. 36–63.
3. Patrick Porter, "[Winston Churchill, Arch-Pragmatist](#)," 29 November 2022, *Engelsberg Ideas*, 5 pages.

WEEK 9: HENRY KISSINGER (OCTOBER 14 AND OCTOBER 16)

Henry Kissinger (1923-2023), a native of Germany, was there when fascism rose in Europe, fought Nazi Germany in the Second World War, and held power during the height of the Cold War. In his role as U.S. national security adviser (1969-1975) and secretary of state (1973-1977), Henry Kissinger played a decisive role in the expansion of the Vietnam War to Cambodia and Laos and the overthrow of democratically elected leaders such as Salvador Allende in Chile. As for Kissinger's role in ending official U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War by negotiating the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, he won a Nobel Peace Prize for it. This week, we will analyze Kissinger's record to understand why political the statesman generated great fascination in both admirers and detractors.

Readings: 39 pages

1. Carlos Roa, "[Farewell to Kissinger: A Colossus of Modern Statecraft](#)," 12 January 2023, *Hungarian Conservative*, 3 pages.
2. Symposium, "[Peace or Destruction – What was Kissinger's Impact](#)?" 1 December 2023, *Responsible Statecraft*, 5 pages.
3. Betty Miller Unterberger, [Review of Power Politics and Statecraft: The World According to Kissinger, Review of Diplomacy by Henry Kissinger](#) (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994). *Reviews in American History* 23, no. 4 (1995), pp. 723–728.
4. Michael Pezzullo, "[Conception and Conjecture in Statecraft: Insights from Henry Kissinger](#)," 20 August 2024, *The Strategist*, 5 pages.
5. Vincent Tullo, "[Henry Kissinger Explains how to Avoid World War Three](#)," 17 May 2023, *The Economist*, 10 Pages..
6. Hugh White, "[Henry Kissinger: A Man for the Times](#)," 30 November 2023, *The Interpreter*, 5 pages.
7. Robert D. Kaplan, "[The Tragedy Behind Kissinger's Realpolitik](#)," 30 November 2023, *The UnHerd*, 4 pages.

WEEK 10: RONALD REAGAN (OCTOBER 21 AND OCTOBER 23)

Historians have long debated the factors that brought about the end of the Cold War. At the center of the debate stands US President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989). This week we will analyze Reagan's statecraft by examining his grand strategy. Was his statecraft a product of internal bureaucratic politics that reflected broader internal domestic political pressures? Or was it predicated upon Reagan's reading of the international strategic situation that confronted the United States? This is the classic debate of what drives statecraft: the primacy of domestic policy or the primacy of foreign policy?

Readings: 81 pages

1. Thomas K. Robb and James Cooper, "[In Search of a Winning Grand Strategy: Ronald Reagan's First Term, 1981-5](#)," *The International Review* 45, no. 6 (2023), pp. 957-979.
2. Melvyn P. Leffler, "[Ronald Reagan and the Cold War: What Mattered Most](#)," *Texas National Security Review* 1, no. 3 (May 2018), p. 76-89.
3. Hal Brands, "[Was There a Reagan Grand Strategy? American Statecraft in the Late Cold War](#)," in Hal Brands, [What Good Is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush](#) (Cornell University Press, 2014), pp. 102-143.

WEEK 11: NUCLEAR STATECRAFT (OCTOBER 28 AND OCTOBER 30)

In 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin's implied nuclear threats in the Ukraine war reinvigorated debates on the state of nuclear deterrence, statecraft, and safety. How likely is it that Moscow might utilize nuclear weapons, and what would be the consequences of such actions for the global nuclear order and the future of deterrence? Meanwhile, Iran and North Korea will soon attain nuclear capabilities while China seeks security through the buildup of its nuclear arsenal. Given this new reality of heightened nuclear risk, how should the United States and its allies and partners promote responsible nuclear statecraft, especially as states worldwide draw lessons from Putin's nuclear threats?

Readings: 72 pages

1. Tong Zhao, [*Political Drivers of China's Changing Nuclear Policy: Implications for US-China Nuclear Relations and International Security*](#) (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Publications Department, 2024), pp. 31-54.
2. Zoe Jordan, [*The Future of Nuclear Weapons, Statecraft, and Deterrence after Ukraine*](#) (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania/Perry World House, 2023), 22 pages.
3. James Park and Mark Episkopos, "[Putin and Kim in Pyongyang, making it 'strategic': but even good friends have geopolitical limits](#)," 19 June 2024, *Responsible Statecraft*, 5 pages.
4. James Park, "[Diplomacy Is the Only Way Out of the Coming Korean Peninsula Crisis](#)," 4 November 2022, *The National Interest*, 5 pages.
5. Cameron Keyani, "[IRGC History and Role in Iranian Statecraft](#)," 8 April 2022, *The Hamiltonian*, 6 pages.
6. Tom Collina, [Killing the Iran Nuclear Deal was one of Trump's Biggest Failures](#), 8 May 2024, *Responsible Statecraft*, 6 pages.
7. Ryan Costello, "[Biden's Iran Policy has been a Total Failure](#)," 9 June 2022, *Responsible Statecraft*, 5 pages.

WEEK 12: VLADAMIR PUTIN (NOVEMBER 4 AND NOVEMBER 6)

President Barack Obama described Russia as a "regional power in structural decline." Senator John McClain characterized Russia as "a gas station masquerading as a state." As an unevenly developed Great Power, thus far incapable of structural economic reform, Russia aspires to attain more influence internationally than the size its economy suggests is merited. Like China Russia's global

activism seeks to resist the U.S.-led international order. At the center of it all is Russian President Vladimir Putin. How should we understand Putin's global reach? What are the implications for U.S. interests and those of its friends and allies? Is there a way to uphold U.S. interests and values and those of friends and allies, while still avoiding the risks of miscalculation, escalation, and confrontation with Putin? If not, which risks are acceptable, when, and why?

Readings: 58 pages

1. Graeme P. Herd, "[Understanding Russia's Global Reach](#)," in *Russia's Global Reach: A Security and Statecraft Assessment*, ed. Graeme P. Herd, (Garmisch-Partenkirchen: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 2021), pp. 1-8.
2. George Beebe, Mark Episkopos and Anatol Lieven, "[Right-Sizing the Russian Threat to Europe](#)," 8 July 2024, Quincy Brief # 60, *Responsible Statecraft*, 16 pp.
3. Gertjan Plets and Linda van der Pol, "[World Heritage and Cultural Statecraft in Putin's Russia: Patriotic Agendas, Flexible Power Relations, and Geopolitical Ambitions](#)," *Change Over Time* 11, no. 2 (Fall, 2022), pp. 200-224.
4. Michael Corbin, "[How far can a Putin-Modi hug go?](#)," 11 July 2024, *Responsible Statecraft*, 5 pages.
5. George Beebe, "[We Need a Rational Discussion about the Russian Threat](#)," 12 July 2024, *Responsible Statecraft*, 5 pages.
- 6.

WEEK 13: XI JINPING (NOVEMBER 13 AND NOVEMBER 18)

China's growing economic clout and President Xi Jinping's emphasis on national security have further elevated attention to Beijing's use of economic statecraft. Xi's approach suggests a greater emphasis on using economic means for the pursuit of security goals. This week, we will examine the role of economic statecraft in China's contemporary foreign policy and the evolution of goals and strategies under Xi's leadership; evaluate the record of political effectiveness and continued challenges; and conclude with policy implications. he

Readings: 63 pages

1. Audrye Wong, "[China's Economic Statecraft under Xi Jinping](#)," 22 January 2019, Brookings, 7 pages
2. Paul Gewirtz, "[China, the United States, and the Future of a Rules-based International Order](#)," Brookings, 15 pages.
3. Mercy A. Kuo, "[China's Statecraft and Global Leadership](#)," 23 October 2023, *The Diplomat*, 9 pages.

4. Mercy A. Kuo, "[China's Cybersecurity and Statecraft](#)," 20 February 2024, *The Diplomat*, 8 pages.
5. Vincent K. L. Chang, "[China's New Historical Statecraft: Reviving the Second World War for National Rejuvenation](#)," *International Affairs* 98, no 3 (2022), pp 1053–1069.
6. Andrea Dudik, Misha Savic, and Marton Kasnyik, "[China's Billions Help Xi Make Useful Friends in Eastern Europe](#)," 6 May 2024, *Bloomberg*, 8 pages

WEEK 14: EMERGING POWERS AND THE US (NOVEMBER 20 AND DECEMBER 2)

The structure of international politics is changing in revolutionary ways. The United States has paid a great deal of attention to the rise of China in the last decade but much less to emerging powers whose rise will also shape the operating environment for American statecraft. America has limited ability to influence the trajectory of these emerging powers, identified as Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, and Türkiye. They have taken stances that contrast or directly clash with U.S. positions on China and on Russia over the past few years. Although no single emerging power will have an impact equal to China's, what impact will they collectively have due to their geopolitical weight and diplomatic aspirations, and how will the US respond?

Readings: 76 pages

1. Christopher S. Chivvis and Beatrix Geaghan-Breiner, [Emerging Powers and the Future of American Statecraft](#) (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Publications Department, 2024), 76 pages.

Assignment: Analytical Paper (Due 5 by 5pm)

Grading Scale

For information on UF's grading policies for assigning grade points, see [here](#).

A	94 - 100%		C	74 - 76%
A-	90 - 93%		C-	70 - 73%
B+	87 - 89%		D+	67 - 69%
B	84 - 86%		D	64 - 66%
B-	80 - 83%		D-	60 - 63%
C+	77 - 79%		E	<60

Grading Rubrics

Participation Rubric

A	Typically comes to class with questions about the readings in mind. Engages others about ideas, respects the opinions of others and consistently elevates the level of discussion
B	Does not always come to class with questions about the reading in mind. Waits passively for others to raise interesting issues. Some in this category, while courteous and articulate, do not adequately listen to other participants or relate their comments to the direction of the conversation.
C	Attends regularly but typically is an infrequent or unwilling participant in discussion.
D-E	Fails to attend class regularly and is inadequately prepared for discussion.

Writing Rubric

	A	B	C	D-E
Thesis and Argumentation	Thesis is clear, specific, and presents a thoughtful, critical, engaging, and creative interpretation. Argument fully supports the thesis both logically and thoroughly.	Thesis is clear and specific, but not as critical or original. Shows insight and attention to the text under consideration. May have gaps in argument's logic.	Thesis is present but not clear or specific, demonstrating a lack of critical engagement to the text. Argument is weak, missing important details or making logical leaps with little support.	Thesis is vague and/or confused, demonstrates a failure to understand the text. Argument lacks any logical flow and does not utilize any source material.
Use of Sources	Primary (and secondary texts, if required) are well incorporated, utilized, and contextualized throughout.	Primary (and secondary texts, if required) are incorporated but not contextualized significantly.	Primary (and secondary texts, if required) are mostly incorporated but are not properly contextualized.	Primary and/or secondary texts are absent.
Organization	Clear organization. Introduction provides adequate background information and ends with a thesis. Details are in logical order. Conclusion is strong and states the point of the paper.	Clear organization. Introduction clearly states thesis, but does not provide as much background information. Details are in logical order, but may be more difficult to follow. Conclusion is recognizable and ties up almost all loose ends.	Significant lapses in organization. Introduction states thesis but does not adequately provide background information. Some details not in logical or expected order that results in a distracting read. Conclusion is recognizable but does not tie up all loose ends.	Poor, hard-to-follow organization. There is no clear introduction of the main topic or thesis. There is no clear conclusion, and the paper just ends. Little or no employment of logical body paragraphs.
Grammar, mechanics, and MLA Style	No errors.	A few errors.	Some errors.	Many errors.

Analysis	Analyses, evaluates, compares and/or contrasts issues and events with depth.	Analyses or evaluates issues and events, but not in any depth.	Lacks analysis or evaluation of the issues and events beyond stating accurate, relevant facts.	Lacks analysis or evaluation of the issues and events beyond stating vague, irrelevant, and/or inaccurate facts.
Evidence	Incorporates pertinent and detailed information from both class discussions and assigned readings.	Includes relevant facts, examples and details but does not support all aspects of the task evenly.	Includes relevant facts, examples and details, but omits concrete examples, includes inaccurate information and/or does not support all aspects of the task.	Does not incorporate information from pertinent class discussion and/or assigned readings.
Writing	Presents all information clearly and concisely, in an organized manner.	Presents information fairly and evenly and may have minor organization problems.	Lacks focus, somewhat interfering with comprehension.	Organizational problems prevent comprehension.

IV. Student Learning Outcomes (SLOs)

At the end of this course, students will be expected to have achieved the [Quest](#) and [General Education](#) learning outcomes as follows:

Content: *Students demonstrate competence in the terminology, concepts, theories and methodologies used within the discipline(s).*

- Identify, describe, and explain the methodologies used across humanities disciplines to examine essential ideas about just war (Quest 1, H). **Assessment:** midterm exam, analytical essay, in-class reading quizzes.
- Identify, describe, and explain key ideas and questions about just war from antiquity to the present (Quest 1, H). **Assessment:** midterm exam, analytical essay, in-class reading quizzes.

Critical Thinking: *Students carefully and logically analyse information from multiple perspectives and develop reasoned solutions to problems within the discipline(s).*

- Analyze how philosophical, political and historical works from antiquity through the present explore just war (Quest 1, H). **Assessment:** analytical essay, midterm exam.
- Analyze and evaluate specific accounts of human reaction to concepts that challenge our own notions of just war, using close reading, critical analysis, class discussion, and personal reflection. (Quest 1, H). **Assignments:** analytical essay, discussion questions, midterm exam.

Communication: *Students communicate knowledge, ideas and reasoning clearly and effectively in written and oral forms appropriate to the discipline(s).*

- Develop and present clear and effective written and oral work that demonstrates critical engagement with course texts, and experiential learning activities (Quest 1, H). **Assessments:** experiential learning interview report and discussion, analytical essay, midterm exam.
- Communicate well-supported ideas and arguments effectively within class discussion and debates, with clear oral presentation and written work articulating students' personal experiences and reflections on just war (Quest 1, H). **Assessments:** active class participation, experiential learning component, discussion questions.

Connection: *Students connect course content with meaningful critical reflection on their intellectual, personal, and professional development at UF and beyond.*

- Connect course content with students' intellectual, personal, and professional lives at UF and beyond. (Quest 1). **Assessments:** experiential learning component, analytical paper, discussion questions.

- Reflect on students' own and others' experience with just war, in class discussion and written work (Quest 1). **Assessments:** experiential learning component, analytical paper, discussion questions.

V. Quest Learning Experiences

1. Details of Experiential Learning Component

During this semester, the class will attend one of the WSS special guest presentation, followed by in-class discussion.

2. Details of Self-Reflection Component

Self-reflection is built into many of the assignments, primarily through the reading questions that students create, the analytic essay assignment, and just war experiential learning assignment. In these opportunities for self-reflection offered by specific activities throughout the course, students will reflect on the broader implications of the themes of the course, considering the impact to themselves and/or to a wider community.

VI. Required Policies

Academic Policies

All academic policies in this course are consistent with university policies, which can be found [here](#).